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  We investigate combinatorial auctions from a practical perspective. The auctioneer gathers 
information according to a dynamical protocol termed ask price procedure. We demonstrate a 
method for elucidating whether a procedure gathers sufficient information for deriving a VCG 
mechanism. We calculate representative valuation functions in a history-contingent manner, and 
show that it is necessary and sufficient to examine whether efficient allocations with and 
without any buyer associated with the profile of representative valuation functions were 
revealed. This method is tractable, and can be applied to general procedures with connectedness. 
The representative valuation functions could be the sufficient statistics for privacy preservation. 
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  This paper investigates the combinatorial auction problem, wherein a single seller 
sells multiple, indivisible items with multiple units to multiple buyers who have private 
and quasi-linear valuations; these items are divided into multiple disjoint packages in 
order to sell them in an efficient manner. We investigate general dynamical auction 
protocols in a continuous time horizon a la Tatonnement, which are termed ask price 
procedures in this paper’s terminology. According to an ask price procedure, the 
auctioneer gathers information regarding the buyers’ valuations on packages in that he 
(or she) continues to ask prices of each buyer and requires this buyer to announce a 
collection of packages as his (or her) demand correspondence. In order to consider the 
buyers’ convenience, the auctioneer can restrict the range of each buyer’s demand 
correspondences in a history-contingent manner. 
  This paper examines whether an arbitrary given ask price procedure can 
successfully gather sufficient information regarding the buyers’ valuations to derive an 
efficient allocation. In this case, the usage of the gathered information must be 
compatible with the buyers’ incentives in terms of voluntary participation and sincere 
demand correspondence. This paper also elucidates the extent to which the information 
regarding the buyers’ valuations, which may be irrelevant to the auctioneer’s decision, 
could be leaked to the public. 
  The revelation principle, addressed by Myerson (1979), implies that an arbitrary 
well-behaved indirect mechanism could be replaced with a direct mechanism, wherein 
each buyer is required to announce his entire valuations simultaneously on possible 
packages. Many researchers have intensively studied a special class of direct 
mechanism named VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) mechanisms
1, which are the only 
efficient mechanisms that are strategy-proof, that is, incentive compatible in terms of 
dominant strategies, and ex post individually rational, that is, never drive the buyers 
into deficit in ex post terms.
2 
  The standard practice of VCG mechanisms, wherein buyers directly announce their 
                                                 
1  See Vickrey (1961), Clarke (1971), and Groves (1973). 
2 For the surveys on mechanism design in general, see, for example, Fudenberg and Tirole 
(1993, Chapter 7) and Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995, Chapter 23). 3 
 
entire valuations, has serious flaws from a practical standpoint in terms of complexity 
and privacy preservation. First, since the number of possible packages is exponential 
with regard to the number of items, it may be too complicated for any buyer who has 
normal limitations on his cognitive ability to assess and report his entire valuations on 
all packages simultaneously. Second, any buyer may be concerned about preserving his 
privacy, because he is afraid that any information that is confidential but not relevant to 
the auctioneer’s decisions could be leaked to the public. The revelation principle, 
however, does not address these concerns.
3  Hence, it would be very meaningful for the 
combinatorial auction problem to attempt to search for the possibility of replacing the 
standard practice of a direct mechanism with an alternative indirect auction protocol, in 
order to make information gathering compatible with the addressing of practical issues 
such as complexity and privacy preservation. 
  Market design approaches, including those of Kelso and Crawford (1982), Gul and 
Stacchetti (2000), Ausubel (2006), Ausubel, Cramton, and Milgrom (2006), Parkes and 
Ungar (2002), Lahaie and Parkes (2004), and Mishra and Parkes (2007), have examined 
various concepts for dynamical combinatorial auction design to address the dilemma 
over complexity and privacy preservation. It is a well-accepted view in the 
communication complexity literature that the replacement of a simultaneous direct 
revelation with a dynamical protocol that involves price adjustments including feedback 
could drastically reduce the communication cost.
4  Moreover, we could imagine that any 
popular protocol is generally characterized by some tacit limitations concerning the 
extent to which the auctioneer can make ask prices non-linear and non-unanimous and 
the extent to which he can limit the range of the packages from which each buyer can 
select his demand correspondence. Hence, an important research direction as the 
alternative to a more ideal protocol design would be to explore generally applicable and 
tractable calculation methods for elucidating whether an arbitrary given ask price 
procedure can gather sufficient information for deriving a VCG mechanism. In other 
words, the research will elucidate whether there exists a VCG mechanism that is 
                                                 
3 For the criticisms of VCG mechanisms or direct mechanisms in general, see, for example, 
Rothkopf, Teisberg, and Kahn (1990), Milgrom (2004), Ausubel and Milgrom (2006), Parkes 
(2006), and Segal (2006). 
4  See, for example, Nisan and Segal (2006) and Segal (2006), for example. 4 
 
price-based on the ask price procedure according to this paper’s terminology, and how 
this VCG mechanism can explicitly be derived. 
  This paper introduces an assumption on an ask price procedure named 
connectedness, implying that the auctioneer cannot make his ask prices jump 
discontinuously to prices that he has never asked before, as well as implying that the 
auctioneer cannot entirely prohibit any buyer from revealing the same package as the 
one that he has revealed before. This connectedness has a nice property in that 
irrespective of the fine detail of protocol specifications, the auctioneer can always 
identify the difference in valuation between packages that a buyer has revealed. This 
property would drastically simplify the identification of the side payments induced by a 
VCG mechanism. Despite this nice property, the set of connected ask price procedures 
are still too extensive to cover all the concepts of dynamical protocol design discussed 
in the combinatorial auction literature, such as the multiple linear price trajectories 
addressed by Ausubel (2006), and the primal-dual algorithm discovering a universal 
competitive equilibrium addressed by Parkes and Ungar (2002) and Mishra and Parkes 
(2007). 
  The main contribution of this paper is to demonstrate the following general 
calculation method for elucidating whether there exists a VCG mechanism that is 
price-based on an arbitrary given connected ask price procedure, and for deriving such a 
VCG mechanism. On the basis of the history regarding the sequence of ask prices and 
demand correspondences, we can define the representative valuation function for each 
buyer by assigning any revealed package with the minimal relative valuations in a 
manner that is consistent with the history. The representative valuation function exists 
uniquely and can be easily calculated in a history-contingent manner. The auctioneer 
can at any time, irrespective of what has occurred in the history, easily identify whether 
he (or she) has succeeded in gathering sufficient information for implementing a VCG 
outcome using this calculated profile of representative valuation functions alone. All the 
auctioneer has to do for this identification is to examine whether history reveals the 
efficient allocation and the efficient allocations without any single buyer associated with 
the profile of representative valuation functions. 
  There are many researches, including Kelso and Crawford (1982), Gul and 
Stacchetti (2000), Bikhchandani and Ostroy (2002), Parkes and Ungar (2002), Lahaie 5 
 
and Parkes (2004), and Mishra and Parkes (2007), that investigated the relationship 
between the possibility of a mechanism being price-based on an ask price procedure and 
the discovery of competitive equilibrium prices in this procedure. In particular, Parkes 
and Ungar (2002), Lahaie and Parkes (2004), and Mishra and Parkes (2007) introduced 
an involved notion termed universal competitive equilibrium, and showed an important 
characterization implying that the auctioneer can gather sufficient information to 
implement a VCG mechanism if and only if the gathered information identifies a 
universal competitive equilibrium. However, these works failed to provide any method 
for elucidating which universal competitive equilibrium could be identified. They also 
failed to clarify the extent to which the information regarding the buyers’ valuations 
could be leaked. 
  In contrast to these works, the present paper successfully provides such a method, 
because the profile of representative valuation functions could be a universal 
competitive equilibrium. Importantly, because of the connectedness, we can show that 
the profile of representative valuation functions, along with the sets of all revealed 
packages, could be the sufficient statistics for privacy preservation, that is, the extent to 
which the information regarding the buyers’ valuations could be leaked. 
  On the basis of this paper’s main contribution, we can argue regarding more 
constructive aspects of price-based VCG mechanisms. Assume that, according to an ask 
price procedure, when an auctioneer never stops the asking of prices, he can eventually 
make the buyers reveal all packages; the auctioneer surely identifies a time at which the 
associated profile of representative valuation functions implies a universal competitive 
equilibrium in this case. Then, by stopping the asking of prices at this time, the 
auctioneer can successfully implement a VCG outcome. 
  Finally, from the viewpoint of the incomplete contract literature, such as Tirole 
(1999), we will argue with regard to the possibility that the auctioneer’s discretion to 
select an ask price procedure at the pre-play stage further preserves the buyers’ privacy. 
With this discretion, the auctioneer can utilize his private information regarding the 
buyers’ valuations. In this case, since the profile of representative valuation functions 
and the sets of all revealed packages can verify whether his selected outcome is VCG, 
the auctioneer does not have to make any agreement beforehand with the buyers and the 
sellers regarding the fine details of the procedure. 6 
 
  In order to prevent the buyers from behaving strategically and promote their 
meaningful biddings, activity rules were proposed by several authors and incorporated 
into real situations. For example, see Milgrom (2004) and Ausubel, Cramton, and 
Milgrom (2006). Accordingly, the present paper assumes the revealed preference 
activity rule in the sense that throughout the ask price procedure, any buyer is required 
to make his demand responses consistent with a single valuation function. 
  Several previous works, including Kelso and Crawford (1982), Gul and Stacchetti 
(2000), and Ausubel (2006), have imposed restrictions on the buyers’ valuations such as 
substitute conditions. In contrast to these works, the present paper does not put any such 
restriction on valuations; we admit all cases that include mixtures of substitutes and 
complements. Moreover, many works have focused on ascending auction protocols. In 
contrast, this paper considers general price adjustments including ascending types, 
descending types, or a mixture of ascending and descending. 
  The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 models the 
combinatorial auction problem. Section 3 introduces the concepts of ask price procedure 
and price-based mechanism. Section 4 introduces the concept of connectedness. Section 
5 introduces the concept of representative valuation functions. Section 6 shows a 
necessary and sufficient condition under which there exists a VCG mechanism that is 
price-based on an arbitrary given ask price procedure. Section 7 shows the main 
contribution of this paper, that is, demonstrating a calculation method according to 
which the necessary and sufficient condition in Section 6 can be replaced with a much 
more tractable condition using representative valuation functions. Section 8 investigates 
any ask price procedure, wherein the buyers reveal all packages in the long run, 
provided the auctioneer never stops asking prices. Section 9 clarifies the conceptual 
relationship between representative valuation functions and universal competitive 
equilibrium. Section 10 discusses the role of the auctioneer’s discretion. Section 11 




  Let us investigate a combinatorial auction problem wherein  1 l   multiple items 
exist, with  z m  multiple units for each item  {1,..., } zl   that a single seller supplies to 
multiple buyers. The set of buyers is denoted by  {1,..., } Nn  . A package for each 
buyer  iN    is denoted by  1 ( ,..., ) ii i l aa a  , where  {0,..., } iz z am    denotes the amount 






  . Let  i i aA    denote the null package 
for buyer  i, where 
0 iz a   for  all  {1,..., } zl  . 









   for  each  {1,..., } zl  . 
Let  i iN A A
    denote the set of all allocations. An allocation without a buyer  iN   is 














    denote the set of all allocations without a buyer  iN  . 
 A  valuation function for buyer  iN   is defined as  : ii uA R  ; where it is 
quasi-linear,  ()0 i i ua  , and any increase in the amount of items has a positive value; 
for every  { , } ii i aa A    
( 1 )      () () ii ii ua ua    if  ii aa    and  ii aa   . 
We do not impose any further restriction on the possible valuation functions; we 
consider any type that mixes substitutes and complements. Let  i U   denote the set of all 










  , ( ) iiN uu U   , and 
\{ } () ij j N i i uu U   . An allocation  aA    is said to be efficient for  uU   if 




    for  all aA   . 8 
 
Let 
*() Au A   denote the set of all efficient allocations for uU  . An allocation 
i
ii aA     without a buyer  i  is said to be efficient for  ii uU     if 
   
\{ } \{ }
() () j ij i
jN i jN i
ua ua

    for  all 
i




ii i A uA     denote the set of all efficient allocations without buyer i  for 
ii uU   . 
 A  direct mechanism, hereinafter a mechanism, is defined as  ( , ) Gg q  , where 
: gU A   denotes the allocation function, and  :
n qU R   denotes the side payment 
function. Let us denote  ( ) ( ( )) ii N gu g u A    , ( ) iiN qq   , : i qU R  , and 
() ( () )
n
ii N qu q u R   . When the auctioneer applies the mechanism G  to  the 
combinatorial auction problem in the standard manner, and those players having a true 
profile of valuation functions  uU   directly announce that their profile of valuation 
functions is  uU   , the auctioneer will select the allocation  () gu A    and make the 
side payment  ( ) i qu R    from each buyer  iN   to the seller; the resulting payoff for 
buyer  i  is given by 
(( ) ) ( ) ii i ugu qu   , 




   . 
 A  mechanism  G   is said to be efficient if 
* () () gu A u   for  all uU  . 
A mechanism  G   is said to be strategy-proof if truth telling is a dominant strategy at all 
times, that is, for every  iN  , every  uU  , and every  ii uU   , 
   (() ) () ((, ) ) (, ) ii i i i i i i ug u qu ug uu quu      . 
A mechanism  G   is said to be ex post individually rational if the seller and buyers have 
incentive to participate in the combinatorial auction problem, that is, for every  uU  , 




   , 
and 
(() ) () 0 ii ug u qu   for  all iN  . 9 
 
It is a well-accepted view that a mechanism is efficient, strategy-proof, and ex post 
individually rational if and only if it is a VCG mechanism in the following sense. 
 
Definition 1: A mechanism  G  is  VCG if for every  uU  , 
   
* () () gu A u  , 
and 
   
\{ } \{ }
() m a x ( ) ( () )
i
ii
ij j j j
aA jN i jN i
qu ua u gu
  
  for  all iN  . 
 
  We shall focus on VCG mechanisms throughout this paper. 10 
 
3. Price-Based Mechanisms 
 




ii i a A p pa R   , where we 
assumed that  ()0 i i pa  , and 
( 2 )      () () ii ii p ap a    if  ii aa    and  ii aa   . 




   denote 
a profile of price vectors; we consider the possibility that prices are non-linear and 
non-anonymous. 
Let 
{| } ii i i EMA M     
denote the set of all non-empty subsets of packages for buyer i. We consider the 
situation wherein instead of applying the standard practice in which the buyers directly 
announce their valuation functions, the auctioneer will apply the following dynamical 
auction protocol. At any time  t in the continuous time horizon  [0, )  , the auctioneer 
asks a price vector  ( ) ii p tP   of each buyer  iN  , and he (or she) requires this buyer 
to announce his (or her) demand correspondence as the collection of the best response 
packages among a restricted subset of packages given by  ( ) ii M tE  . Correspondingly, 
this buyer announces his demand correspondence as a non-empty subset, that is, 
() () ii mt Mt  . 
  A combination of a price vector, a subset of packages, and a demand 
correspondence for buyer i, which is denoted by ( , , ) ii i iii p Mm PE E  , where it 
was assumed that  ii mM  , is said to be consistent with a valuation function  ii uU   
for buyer  i if  i m   is equivalent to the set of all best responses to  i p  with  a  restriction 
on  i M , that is, 
argmax{ ( ) ( )}
ii
ii i i i
aM
mu a p a

 . 
A history for each buyer,  iN  , up to each time, (0, ) t  , is denoted by 
:[0, )
t
i iii htP E E , 11 
 
where, for each  [0, ) t   , we denoted  ( ) ( ( ), ( ), ( ))
t
ii i i hp M m      and assumed 
() () ii mM    . It is said to be consistent with  ii uU   if  ( )
t
ii i i hP E E    is 
consistent with  i u  for each  [0, ) t   . Let 
0
i h  denote the null history. Let  ()
t
ii Hu 




















  , ( )
tt t
ii N hh H   , and 
00 {} ii Hh  . For 
every 
tt
ii hH  , we define the set of all valuation functions for buyer  i with  which 
t
i h  
is consistent as 
   (){ | () }
tt t
ii i i i i i Uh u Uh Hu   . 
For every 
tt
ii hH  , let 
    ( ) { | ( ) [ 0 , ) }
t
ii i i i i Ah a Aa m f o r s o m e t     . 
This denotes the set of all packages for buyer i that he announces as his demand 
response in the history 
t
i h , where  () ( () , () , () )
t








 An ask price procedure, describing the practice of a dynamical auction protocol, is 
defined as  ( , , ) T   , where  ( ) iiN      denotes the price adjustment rule, : ii HP    
for each  iN  , and  ( ) iiN      denotes the demand restriction rule, : ii HE    for 
each  iN  , and  :( 0 , ) TU   denotes  the  stopping time rule. According to the price 
adjustment rule   , at any time  [0, ) t   where 
tt hH   has occurred, the auctioneer 
asks the price vector  ( )
t
ii hP    of each buyer  iN  . In this case, according to the 
demand restriction rule  , the auctioneer restricts this buyer’s demand response 
packages to the subset  ()
t
ii hA   . For the sake of convenience, we assume that at the 
initial time 0, the auctioneer does not restrict each buyer’s demand responses: 
   
0 () ii hA    for  all iN  . 
 Let  ( , , )
tt hh u     denote the history up to time  t that occurs when the buyers 
continue to announce their demand correspondences in the manner consistent with the 
profile of valuation functions u  and the auctioneer continues to ask price vectors 12 
 
according to the price adjustment rule     and the demand restriction rule   : 
(,, ) ()
tt hu Hu  , 
and 
    ( )( ) ii p h
    and  ( ) ( ) ii M h
    for  all iN   and  all  [0, ) t   , 
where ( , , ) ( ( , , ))
tt
ii N hu hu     , and for every  iN  , 
(,, ) () () ( () , () , () )
tt
ii i i i hu h p M m         for  all  [0, ) t   . 
  In order to maintain the generality of the argument, we permit non-linearity and 
non-anonymity of price asking. However, it must be noted that it is implicitly assumed 
that a particular specification of a price adjustment rule   reflects some practical 
obstacle that prevents the auctioneer to a greater or lesser extent from having a free 
hand to manage the ask price adjustment. 
  Importantly, we assume the revealed preference activity rule in the sense that 
throughout the ask price procedure, any buyer is required to make his demand responses 
consistent with a single valuation function. When the auctioneer follows the price 
adjustment rule     and the demand restriction rule   , and the buyers continue to make 
their demand correspondence in a manner consistent with the profile of valuation 
functions  uU  , the auctioneer stops asking price vectors at the time given by 
() ( 0 , ) tT u   . In this case, it should be assumed that the stopping time rule  T  is 
contingent only on the history: for every { , } uu U   , if 
() (,, )
Tu hu    is consistent 
with  u, that is, if 
() (( , , ) )
Tu uU h u    , then   
() ( ) Tu Tu   , and 
() ( ) ( ,,) (,,)
Tu Tu hu hu   
    
must hold. Let 
   
() (,,) { | (,,) }
tt T u HT h H h h u f o r s o m e u U     . 
This denotes the set of all histories that can occur under the assumption of revealed 
preference activity rule. 
 
Definition 2: A mechanism  ( , ) Gg q   is price-based on an ask price procedure 
(,,) T   , if for every  ( , , )
t hH T    and  every { , } ( )
t uu Uh   , 
   ( ( ), ( )) ( ( ), ( )) gu qu gu qu    . 13 
 
 
  The price-based property in Definition 2 implies that the auctioneer’s selection of 
an allocation and side payments is contingent only on the public information about the 
profile of valuation functions that the auctioneer collects in the ask price procedure 
(,,) T   .
5 The following lemma shows that whenever a mechanism is efficient and 
price-based on an ask price procedure, the allocation induced by the mechanism must 
be revealed by the buyers in this ask price procedure. 
 
Lemma 1: If a mechanism  G  is efficient and price-based on an ask price procedure 
(,,) T   , then 
   
() () ( (,,) )
Tu gu Ah u    for  all uU  . 
 
Proof: For every  0    and  every uU  , we define  , ii uU    as 
, ()0 i i ua   , 
and 
, () () ii i i ua u a     for  all  \{ } i ii aAa  . 
Assume that there exists  uU   and iN   such  that 
   
() ( )(( , , ) )
Tu
ii i gu Ah u    . 
Note that if 
() (( , , ) )) (
Tu




i hu     must also be consistent with  , i u   for  all  0   , that is, 
()
, (( , , ) )
Tu
ii i uU h T     for  all  0   , 
which, along with the price-based property and efficiency of  G , implies that 
*
,, (,) ( ) (,) ii ii gu u gu A u u     for  all  0   . 
This is, however, a contradiction, because any efficient allocation, namely, 
*
, (,) ii aA uu     for  , (,) ii uu   , never satisfies  i i aa  , provided   is sufficiently 
large. 
                                                 
5  We address this point in subsection 9.2. 14 
 
 Assume  that 
() i i gu a  . 
Then, we can select  \{ ( )} iii aAg u   such  that 
() ii ag u  , 
and for every  \{ , ( )} iii i aAa g u   such  that  ( ) ii ag u   , 
    (( ) ) () (( ) ) () ii ii ii ii ugu ua ugu ua   . 
From inequalities (1), we can select  ii uu    with which 
() (,,)
Tu
i hT   is consistent, 
that is, 
() (( , , ) )
Tu
ii i uU h T   ; 
we can also select  \{} jNi   in a way that  ( ( )) ( ) ii ii ugu ua     is close enough to zero 
to satisfy the following equation: 
(3)     (( ) ) ( ) (( ) ( ) ) (( ) ) i i i i jj i i jj ugu ua ugu gu a ugu     . 
Let us specify  ˆ aA   by 
    ˆii aa  , 
    ˆ () () j ji i ag ug ua  , 
and 
    ˆ () hh ag u   for  all  \{, } hNi j  . 
From inequality (3), 
   
\{ } \{ }
ˆˆ ( ( )) ( ( )) ( ) ( ) ii hh ii hh
hN i hN i
ugu ugu ua ua

    , 
which implies that  () gu  is not efficient for  (, ) ii uu   . However, since 
() (,, )
Tu
i hu    is 
consistent with  i u, it must hold that  (, ) ( ) ii gu u gu    . This contradicts the efficiency 





 A  history 
t
i h  for buyer i up to time t is said to be connected if for every 
(0, ) t   , either 
() l i m ( ) ii pp
  

  , ( ) lim ( ) ii MM
  

  , and  ( ) lim ( ) ii Mm
  

   , 
or, there exists  (0, )     such  that 
() ( ) ii pp    , ( ) ( ) ii MM    , and  ( ) ( ) ii Mm      , 
where ( ) ( ( ), ( ), ( ))
t
ii i i hp M m     . The connectedness implies that the auctioneer 
never makes his asked price vector jump discontinuously to any price vector that he has 
never asked before. It also implies that the auctioneer never prohibits the possibility that 
a buyer announces the same package as the one that he has revealed before. Moreover, it 
implies that whenever the auctioneer permits a buyer to reveal a package that this buyer 
has been prohibited from revealing, he must go back to a previous time at which this 
buyer was permitted to reveal this package.
6 This last aspect of the implication 
indicates that this paper accepts the concept of multiple linear price trajectories 
addressed by Ausubel (2006). 
  The following lemma shows that on the assumption of this connectedness, the 
auctioneer can calculate the difference in valuation for any buyer between any pair of 
packages whenever this buyer reveals these packages in the ask price procedure. 
 
Lemma 2: For every history,
tt
ii hH  , that is connected, and for every  {,} ()
t
ii ii aa Ah   , 
there uniquely exists  (,,)
t
iiii x aah R     such that for every  ()
t
ii i uU h  , 
    (,,) () ()
t




ii hH   is connected, there exists a finite sequence of times and actions 
1 (,)
ll k
il a    such  that 
k   is a positive integer that is greater than 1, 
                                                 
6  It is possible to go back to such a time because we assumed that 
0 () ii hA    for  all iN  . 16 
 
   
1
ii aa   , 
k
ii aa  , 
    [ 0 , )
l t    and  ()
ll
ii am    for  all  {1,..., } lk  , 
and 




   for  all  {2,..., } lk  , 
where ( ) ( ( ), ( ), ( ))
t
ii i i hp M m     . For every  ( )
t
ii i uU h   and every  {2,..., } lk  , 
since 
1 {, } ()
ll l
ii i aa m 
  , it follows that 
   
11 () () () ( ) () ( )
ll ll l l
ii i i ii i i ua p a ua p a 
   . 
Hence, 
(4)     
11
22
() () {() ( ) } {() () () ( ) }
kk
l l ll ll
ii ii ii ii i i i i
ll
ua ua ua ua p a p a 


      . 
Let us specify  (,,)
t
iiii x aah R    as 
   
1
2
( , , ) { ( )( ) ( )( )}
k
tl l l l
iiii i i i i
l
x a a h pa pa 


   . 
Since this specification does not depend on the selection of  ( )
t
ii i uU h  , it is clear from 
the equalities (4) that for every  ()
t
ii i uU h   and  every {,} ()
t
ii ii aa Ah   , 
    () () (,,)
t
ii ii iiii ua ua xaah   . 
Q.E.D. 
 
An ask price procedure  ( , , ) T    is said to be connected if for every  (0, ) t , 
every  uU  , and every  iN  , ( , , )
tt
ii hu H   is connected. Throughout this paper, 
we shall confine our attention to ask price procedures that are connected. Because of 
Lemma 2, the concept of connectedness along with that of representative valuations, 
which will be addressed in the next section, will play the central role in calculating the 
side payments induced by a VCG mechanism. Despite this nice property, the class of 
connected ask price procedures is still too extensive to include various concepts for 
combinatorial auction design, such as the multiple linear price trajectories addressed by 
Ausubel (2006) and the primal-dual algorithm for discovering a universal competitive 
equilibrium, addressed by Parkes and Ungar (2002) and Mishra and Parkes (2004). This 17 
 
paper considers general price adjustments including ascending types, descending types, 
or mixtures of ascending and descending. 
 18 
 
5. Representative Valuation Functions 
 
  For every buyer  iN  , every time  (0, ) t  , and every history 
tt
ii hH   that is 




ii uU   according to the 
following tractable method of calculation, which should be regarded as this paper’s key 




i i ua  , and fix an arbitrary 
package for buyer i that belongs to  ( )
t
ii Ah , which is denoted by  ( ) ii
t
i aA h   . For 
every ( )\{ }
t
i i ii aA h a   , specify 
   
[] [] () () (,,)
tt
ii hh t
ii iii i i i uauax a a h   , 
and for every  ( )
t
i ii ah A  , 
   
[] []
[0, ), ( ),
()






ii ii i i i i ta M
am






   , 
where we denote that  ( ) ( ( ), ( ), ( ))
t
ii i i hp M m     . The latter part of the specifications 
implies that the representative valuation function assigns the maximal absolute value to 




ii N uu   . Because 





i u  exists  uniquely. 




i u  
assigns any revealed package  ( )
t
i ii ah A   with the minimal possible valuation in 
relative terms. It also shows that the set of all valuation functions consistent with the 
history 
tt
ii hH  , that is,  ( )
t





i u   and the set of revealed packages  ( )
t
ii Ah . Hence, the 




i u , along with the set of revealed packages  ()
t
ii A h , 
could be regarded as the sufficient statistics concerning the extent to which the 
information about buyer  ' is  valuation  function  i u   was leaked in the history 
t
i h . 
 
Proposition 3:  For every  [0, ) t , every connected history 
tt
ii hH  , and every 19 
 
ii uU  , it holds that  ()
t
ii i uU h  , if and only if for every  ()
t
ii i aA h  , 
[] [] () () () ()
tt
ii hh
ii ii i i i i ua ua u a u a     for  all  ()
t
ii i aA h  , 
and 
[] [] () () () ()
tt
ii hh
ii ii i i i i ua ua u a u a     for  all  ()
t
ii i aA h  . 
In this case, 









ii i i ua u a    if and only if  ()
t
i ii aA h  . 
 




i u . From 




i u  and  ( )
t
ii i aA h  , if  ( )
t
ii i uU h  , then for every  ii aA  , 
[] [] () () () ()
tt
ii hh
ii ii i i i i ua ua u a u a    , 
and ( )
t
ii i aA h  , if and only if 
[] [] () () () () (,,)
tt
ii hh t
ii ii i i i i iiii ua ua u a u a xaah     , 
where we have used the assumption of revealed preference activity rule and Lemma 2. 












ii i i ua u a    if and only if  ()
t





6. Price-Based VCG Mechanisms 
 
  The following proposition shows a necessary and sufficient condition for the 
existence of a price-based VCG mechanism; it is necessary and sufficient that 
associated with any profile of valuation functions, the efficient allocation and the 
efficient allocations without any single buyer are revealed in the ask price procedure. 
 
Proposition 4: There exists a VCG mechanism  G  that is price-based on a connected 
ask price procedure (,,) T    if and only if for every  (,,)
t hH T   , there exist 
*() ()
tt ah A h  , and 
*() ()
it t
ii ii ah Ah     for  each iN  , such that for every  ()
t uU h  , 
(5)     
** () ( )
t ah Au  , 
and 
(6)     
** () ()
it i
ii ii ah Au     for  all iN  . 
 
Proof: We prove the “if” part as follows. Assume that for every  ( , , )
t hH T   , there 
exist 
*() ()
tt ah A h  , and 
*() ()
it t
ii ii ah Ah     for  each iN  , that satisfy the properties 
(5) and (6) for all  ( )
t uU h  . Then, we can specify  : gU A    in a way that for every 
(,,)
t hH T    and  every  ( )
t uU h  , 
   
* () )(
t a gh u  . 
We can also specify  : i qU R   for  each  iN    in a way that for every 
(,,)
t hH T    and  every  ( )
t uU h  , 
   
*
\{ }
() ( ( ) , () , )
it t
ij j i j
jN i
qu xa h guh 

  . 
From Lemma 2 and property (6), it follows that 
   
\{ } \{ }
() m a x ( ) ( () )
i
ii
ij j j j
aA jN i jN i
qu ua u gu
  
 , 
which along with property (5) implies that the correspondingly specified mechanism 
(,) Gg q   is  VCG. 
  We prove the “only if” part as follows. Assume that  ( ,( ) ) iiN Gg q    is VCG and 21 
 
price-based on  (,,) T   , where 
   
* () () gu A u   for  all uU  . 
Note from inequalities (1) and (2) that for every iN  , every 
tt
ii hH  , and every 
{,} ()
t
ii ii aa Ah   , there exists  { , } ( )
t
ii ii uu Uh    such  that 
    () () () () ii ii ii ii ua ua ua ua     . 
Hence, for every  uU  , if either 
() () ( (,, ) )
Tu gu Ah u    
or 
() * (( , , ) ) ( )
Tu j
jj j Ah u Au        for  some  jN  , 
then there exist  jN   and  j j uU    such  that 
   
() (, ) ( ( , ,) )
Tu
jj uu U h u      , 
and for every  \{ } iN j  , 
   
\ { ,} \ { ,}
( , ) m a x { ( )( ) } { ( ( ) )( ( ) ) }
i
ii
ij j jj hh j j hh
aA hN ij hN ij




        
   
\{ } \{ }








    ( ) i qu  . 
This contradicts the supposition that  G  is price-based on  ( , , ) T   . Hence, we have 
proved that for every  uU  , 
() () ( (,, ) )
Tu gu Ah u   , 
and 
() * (( , , ) ) ( )
Tu j
jj j Ah u Au         for  all  jN  . 
Assume that there exist  {,} uu U   ,  jN  , and 
j
j j aA     such  that 
   
() (( , , ) )
Tu uU h u     , 
() (( , , ) )
Tu
jj j aA hu      , 
*()
j




jj j aA u     . 22 
 
Without loss of generality, we can select  u   satisfying  that 
\{ } \{ }
() m a x ( ) ( () )
j
jj
ji i i i





    
\{ } \{ }
() (( ) ) ii ii
iN j iN j
ua ugu

   . 
Since 
() () ( (,, ) )
Tu gu Ah u    and 
() (( , , ) )
Tu
jj j aA hu      , 
it follows that 
   
\{ } \{ } \{ } \{ }
( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( ( )) ( ) ii ii ii ii i
iN j iN j iN j iN j
ua ugu ua ugu qu
 
     , 
which implies that 
() () ii qu qu   . 
This contradicts the assumption that  G  is price-based on  (,,) T   . Hence, we have 
proved that for every  uU   and  every  jN  , 
   
()
() *
(( , , ) )














  , 
which implies that there exists 
*() ()
it t
ii ii ah Ah       that satisfies property (6). Moreover, 
Lemma 1 implies that there exists 
*() ()
tt ah A h   for each iN   satisfying property 
(5). 
  From the above observations, we have proved the “only if” part; properties (5) and 
(6) are necessary for the existence of a VCG mechanism that is price-based on 
(,,) T   . 
Q.E.D. 
 
  From the connectedness and Lemma 2, it follows that whenever the auctioneer 
recognizes that an efficient allocation and an efficient allocation without each buyer 
were revealed, he can calculate the differences in valuation among these allocations, and 
therefore, can calculate the side payments induced by a VCG mechanism. 23 
 
7. Main Theorem 
 
  The following theorem, which should be regarded as the main theorem, shows that 
the necessary and sufficient condition in Proposition 4 can be replaced with another 
condition, implying that associated with the profile of representative valuation functions, 
there exist an efficient allocation and an efficient allocation without a single buyer that 
are all revealed in the ask price procedure. This condition could be much simpler and 
more tractable, because all we have to do for evaluating the sufficiency of this condition 
is to examine the case of representative valuation functions. 
 
Theorem 5: There exists a VCG mechanism  G   that is price-based on a connected ask 
price procedure  (,,) T   , if and only if for every  (,,)
t hH T   , 
(7)    
*[ ] () ( )
t th u Ah A    , 
and 
(8)    





ii i Ah Au 

     for  all iN  . 
 
Proof: From Proposition 3 and the specification of 
[]
t h u , it follows that for every  iN  , 
every ( )
t
ii i aA h  , and every  ii aA   , 
   
[] [] () () () ()
tt
ii hh
iiii i ii i uauau au a     for  all  ()
t
i ii uh U  . 
Hence, for every  ( )
t aA h  , 
   
*() aA u   for  all  ()
t uU h   if 
*[ ] ()
t h aA u  . 
From the specification of 
[]
t h u , it follows that for every  ( )
t aA h  , 
*[ ] ()
t h aA u   if 
*() aA u   for  all  ()
t uU h  . 
Hence, we have proved that for every  ( )
t aA h  , 
*[ ] ()
t h aA u  , if and only if 
*() aA u   for  all  ()
t uU h  . 
This observation implies that property (7) is equivalent to property (5). In the same 
manner, we can also prove that for every  j N   and  every  ()
t
jj j aA h    , 
   
*[ ] ()
t jh
jj j aA u    , if and only if 
*()
j
jj j aA u     for  all  ()
t
j jj uU h    . 24 
 
This observation implies that property (8) is equivalent to property (6). 
Q.E.D. 
 
  Since the profile of representative valuation functions 
[]
t h u  minimizes the 
differences in valuation between the efficient allocations and other allocations, the 
requirements for efficiency would be the severest among all relevant profiles of 
valuation functions,  ( )
t uU h  ; hence, it is sufficient to just examine the profile of 
representative valuation functions in this case. 
  We should recall the implication of Proposition 3 that the set of all valuation 
functions consistent with  ( , , )
t hH T   , that is,  ( )
t
ii Uh, can be uniquely identified 




i u  and the set of revealed packages 
()
t
ii Ah . Hence, the extent to which the information regarding the buyers’ valuations is 
leaked to the public can be fully expressed by the profile of representative valuation 




  We can give a practical interpretation of an ask price procedure as follows: At any 
time [0, ) tt  , where 
tt hH    has occurred, the auctioneer calculates the 
corresponding profile of representative valuation functions 
[]
t h u , and examines whether 
there exist the associated efficient allocation  aA   and efficient allocations 
ii
ii aA    
without any buyer, iN   that has been revealed. If the auctioneer identifies such 
allocations, he stops asking price vectors, selects the allocation  a, and makes the side 
payment  i sR    from each buyer  i  to the seller, which is expressed as 
\{ } \{ }
() ()
i
ij j j j
jN i jN i
su a u a

  . 
If the auctioneer fails to find such allocations, he continues to ask price vectors until he 
can find them. 
  Using this interpretation, let us consider any price adjustment rule    and  demand 
restriction rule   , according to which, each buyer can reveal all packages in the long 
run; it is evident from Theorem 5 that there exists a stopping time T  and a VCG 
mechanism  G  such that G  is price-based on the associated ask price procedure 
(,,) T   . 
 
Proposition 6:  Assume that a combination of price adjustment rule and demand 
restriction rule  (,)    satisfy  that 
   lim ( ( , , ))
t
t Ah u A 
   for  all uU  . 
Then, there exist a stopping time rule  T  and a VCG mechanism  G  such that G  is 
price-based on the associated ask price procedure  (,,) T   . 
 
Proof: The proof is evident from Theorem 5. 
Q.E.D. 
 
  We can show a sufficient condition for a combination  ( , )     in order to satisfy the 
assumption in Proposition 6. Fix an arbitrary positive but small real number  0   . 26 
 
Assume that a price adjustment rule    and a demand restriction rule    satisfy that 
for every  uU  , every  (0, ) t , and every  iN  , either 
(( , ,) )
t
ii i Ahu A   , 
or, there exist  ( , ) tt   and  ( ( , , ))
t
ii i aA h u     such  that 
() ii aM t   , 
and 
   
[( , , ) ] [( , , ) ] () ( ) ( ) () ( ) ()
tt
ii hu hu
ii ii i i i i ua ua p t a p t a
         , 
where  i a was a package that was revealed up to time  t and is included in  ( ) i M t , 
that is, 
(( ,,) ) ( )
t
ii i i aA h u M t     . 
In this case, the difference in representative valuation between the unrevealed package 
i a   and the revealed package  i a  shrinks as time goes by: 
   
[ (,,) ] [ (,,) ] [ (,,) ] [ (,,) ] () ( ) () ( )
tt tt
ii i i hu hu hu hu
ii ii ii ii ua ua ua ua
   
   . 
In particular, whenever  (( , ) )
t
ii i aA h u 
  , then it must hold that 
   
[ (,,) ] [ (,,) ] [ (,,) ] [ (,,) ] () ( ) () ()
tt tt
ii i i hu hu hu hu
ii ii ii ii ua ua ua ua
    
   . 
 
Proposition 7: If a price adjustment rule    and a demand restriction rule    satisfy 
the assumption of this section, then, for every  uU  , there exists  (0, ) t   such  that 
    (( , ,) )
t
ii i Ahu A    for  all iN  . 
 
Proof: Consider an arbitrary  uU  . Assume that there exist  iN   and  ii aA  , such 
that 
    (( ,,) )
t
ii i aA h u     for  all  [0, ) t  . 
In this case, without loss of generality, we can select such a package  ii aA   and an 
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[( , , ) ] [( , , ) ] [ ( , , ) ] [ ( , , ) ] () ( ) () ( )
ss s s tt t t
ii i i hu hu h u h u
ii ii i i i i ua ua u a u a
    

    , 
where  (( ,,) )
t
ii i aA h u    . This implies that the value of  i a  diverges into infinity, that 
is, 
   










9. Universal Competitive Equilibrium 
 
  This section will argue that the ask price procedure could be regarded as a price 
discovery process. Because of inequalities (1) and (2), we can express the representative 
valuation function by a  i A -dimensional vector as 





ii i a A uu a   , which we 




ii uP  . This section will show that 
the profile of representative valuation functions could be regarded as a universal 
competitive equilibrium, the notion of which was addressed by Parkes and Ungar (2002) 
and Mishra and Parkes (2004). 




  , is said to be a competitive 
equilibrium for uU  , if there exists an allocation  ( )
CE auA   that maximizes the 
payoffs for the seller and the buyers, that is, 






   for  all aA  , 
and for every  iN   and  ii aA  , 
    () () ( ) ( )
CE CE
ii ii ii ii ua pa ua pa   . 
The concept of competitive equilibrium is an extension of Walrasian equilibrium to the 




 , is said to be a 
competitive equilibrium without buyer i for  ii uU     if there exists an allocation 
without buyer i, 
, ()
iC E i
ii auA   , that maximizes the payoffs for the sellers and the 
buyers, except for buyer  i, satisfying that 
   
,




jN i jN i
p ap a

   for  all 
i
ii aA    , 
and for every  \{} jNi   and  jj aA  , 
   
,, ( ) ( ) () ()
iC E iC E
jj jj jj jj ua pa ua pa   . 
The concept of universal competitive equilibrium is defined as a profile of price vectors 
that satisfies both competitive equilibrium and competitive equilibrium without any 




 , is said to be a universal competitive 29 
 
equilibrium for  uU    if it is a competitive equilibrium for  u , and for every  iN  , it 
is a competitive equilibrium without buyer i for  i u . Whenever  p  is a universal 
competitive equilibrium for u , then the allocations  ( )
CE au  and 
, ()
iC E
i au   could 
satisfy the properties of efficiency in that 
* () ()
CE auA u  , 
and 
,* () ( )
iC E i
ii i auA u     for  all iN  . 
For a further discussion on these equilibrium concepts, see Parkes (2006). 
 
Proposition 8:  For every 
tt hH  , if properties (7) and (8) are satisfied, then the 




i u   is a universal competitive equilibrium 
for all  ()
t
i uU h  . 
 
Proof: From properties (7) and (8), we can select 
*() ()
tt ah A h  , and 
*() ()
it t
ii ii ah Ah     for  each iN  , such that 
   
** [ ] () () ( )
t tt h ah A u hA   , 
and 
   
** [] () () ( )
t
i it t h i
ii ii ii ah Ah Au

       for  all iN  . 
Hence, 
   







   for  all aA  , 
and for every  iN  , 
    
[] [] *
\{ } \{ }
(( ) ) ( )
tt
jj hh jt
ji i j j
jN i jN i
ua h ua

   for  all 
i
ii aA    . 
From Proposition 3, 
*() ()
tt ah A h  , and 
*() ()
it t
ii ii ah Ah     , it follows that for every 
()
t uU h   and  every iN  , 
   
[] [] ** ( ( )) ( ( )) ( ) ( )
tt
ii hh tt
iii i ii ii i i u a h ua h u aua    for  all  ii aA  , 
and for every  \{} j Ni  , 30 
 
   
[] [] ** (( ) ) (( ) ) () ()
tt
jj hh it it
jj j j j j jj j j uah u ah ua u a    for  all  jj aA  . 
These observations imply that 
[]
t h uP    is a universal competitive equilibrium. 
Q.E.D. 
 
  Parkes and Ungar (2002) and Lahaie and Parkes (2004) showed that there exists a 
VCG mechanism that is price-based on an ask price procedure if and only if any 
realized history reveals a universal competitive equilibrium. Theorem 5 and Proposition 
7 demonstrate a tractable method for determining whether the history reveals a universal 
competitive equilibrium and for calculating the universal competitive equilibrium. 
  The previous works such as Parkes and Ungar (2002), Lahaie and Parkes (2004), 
and Mishra and Parkes (2007) investigated ask price procedures, according to which, 
the auctioneer starts with asking the null price vectors, and eventually asks a universal 
competitive equilibrium. The construction in Section 7 could be regarded as a 
generalization of these works; this paper does not necessarily require the auctioneer to 
start with asking the null price vectors nor does it require that the auctioneer ask for a 
universal competitive equilibrium to stop asking the price at any time. 
  We can consider an ask price procedure according to which the auctioneer always 
adjusts his ask prices to the profile of representative valuation functions. In this case, 
whenever the procedure is successful in achieving VCG outcomes, the auctioneer could 
obviously ask a universal competitive equilibrium at any time to stop asking the price. 
  Moreover, according to an ask price procedure, the auctioneer may, at the time of 
stopping to ask the price, ask a universal competitive equilibrium that is different from 
the profile of representative valuation functions. In this case, we must note that although 
the asked universal competitive equilibrium can never be the sufficient statistics for 
privacy preservation, the resulting profile of representative valuations could be the 
sufficient statistics for privacy preservation. 
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10. Auctioneer’s Discretion 
 
  Let us call any combination of an allocation and a profile of side payments, 
(,)
n as A R  , an outcome, where  ()
n
iiN ss R    , and the real number  i s  implies a 
side payment from buyer i to the seller. This section will permit the auctioneer to 
select an ask price procedure in a discretionary manner with some restrictions. With the 
discretion, he does not need to make a pre-play agreement with the seller and the buyers 
in terms of the finer details of the ask price procedure. We will argue that this discretion 
improves upon the preservation of the buyers’ privacy; in particular, the auctioneer can 
make the selection of the ask price procedure contingent on his private information. 
An outcome  ( , ) as  is said to be VCG for  uU   if 
*() aA u  , 
and 
   
\{ } \{ }
max ( ) ( )
i
ii
ij j j j
aA jN i jN i
su a u a
   
    for  all iN  . 
As is evident, a mechanism  G  is VCG if and only if  ( ( ), ( )) gu qu  is VCG for each 
uU  . Assume that the auctioneer is restricted to the selection of a VCG outcome, and 
that he is required to enable the verification of whether the selected outcome is VCG 
only on the basis of the history that occurs. 
  To be precise, let  ˆ HH   denote the set of all histories 
t hH   satisfying 
properties (7) and (8). For every  ˆ t hH  , let  ( )
tn hA R    denote the set of all 
outcomes that are VCG irrespective of  ( )
t uU h  . The auctioneer makes the pre-play 
agreement with the buyers and the seller that he will continue to ask price vectors until 
any history 
t h  that belongs to  ˆ H  occurs. Once  ˆ t hH   has occurred, the auctioneer 
selects an outcome  ( , ) as  from the set  ( )
t h  , where it was assumed that 
[] * () ( )
t th aA h A u   , 
and for every  iN  , there exists 





ii i aA h A u

      such  that 
   
\{ } \{ }
() ()
i
ij j j j
jN i jN i
su a u a

  . 
 Let    denote a subset of connected ask price procedures for each of which there 32 
 
exists a VCG mechanism that is price-based. The selection of an ask price procedure 
from    is within the auctioneer’s discretion. Because of this discretion, the auctioneer 
can utilize his private information to further preserve the buyers’ privacy. Let  
denote the set of private signals for the auctioneer. Let  :U   denote the 
informational structure concerning the occurrence of this signal. The auctioneer receives 
a private signal  () u     that is contingent on the profile of valuation functions 
u . Let  :    describe the manner in which the auctioneer makes the selection of 
an ask price procedure,  ( ) ( , , ) T      , contingent on his private signal,   . The 
auctioneer selects the ask price procedure  ( , , ) T   , according to which, he continues to 
ask prices until the history 
() ˆ (,, )
Tu hu H   occurs. 
  Immediately after observing this history, he stops asking price vectors and selects 
an outcome that is VCG irrespective of  ( )
t uU h    according to a function 
ˆ :
n HA R     , that is, selects  ( ( ), )
tn uh AR    , where it was assumed that 
(() , ) ( )
tt uh h   . 
The mechanism  ˆ ˆˆ (,) Gg q    that the auctioneer implements could be specified by 
   
() ˆˆ (() ,() ) (() , (,,) )
Tu gu qu u h u      for  all uU  , 
where we denoted that  ( , , ) ( ( )) Tu     . Clearly, this mechanism is VCG. 
  It is important to note that the selections of the functions    and  , that is, the 
signal-contingent selection of ask price procedure and outcomes, are within the 
auctioneer’s discretion. The auctioneer’s discretion eliminates the complexity of 
descriptions such as  ,   ,   , and    from the pre-play agreement. The buyers and 
the seller do not even need to know   or  . 
  For example, consider the situation wherein the auctioneer possesses complete 
information regarding the profile of valuation functions: 
U  , and  ( ) uu    for  all uU  . 
Assume that the auctioneer can select any connected ask price procedure that has a 
price-based VCG mechanism, that is,   includes all such connected ask price 
procedures. With this assumption, we can specify a function  :    in a way that 






 , is a universal competitive equilibrium, where  (() ) () (,,) uu T     . 
The auctioneer can immediately identify the revelation of the efficient allocation and the 
efficient allocation without any buyer. The stopping time  () Tu  can be selected to be as 
close to zero as possible. It is clear from the argument in Section 7 that for any profile 




 , there exists an ask price procedure  (,,) T    in  such 
that 
0 () hp   . Since the auctioneer possesses full information regarding the profile of 
valuation functions, he can select any universal competitive equilibrium as the profile of 





  We investigated the combinatorial auction problem from a practical perspective. 
With the assumption of connectedness, we demonstrated a tractable calculation method 
for elucidating whether there exists a VCG mechanism that is price-based on an 
arbitrary given ask price procedure and for explicitly deriving such a VCG mechanism. 
The concept of representative valuation functions played the central role in this method, 
which was easily calculated on the basis of the history as the history-consistent minimal 
relative valuations. All the auctioneer had to do for these elucidations was to examine 
the representative valuation functions; it was necessary and sufficient that the efficient 
allocations with and without any single buyer associated with the profile of 
representative valuation functions were revealed in the history. 
  The profile of representative valuation functions could be a universal competitive 
equilibrium. It could be the sufficient statistics for the extent to which the information 
regarding the buyers’ valuation functions were leaked to the public. Any connected ask 
price procedure, which, without stopping the asking of prices, eventually makes the 
buyers reveal all packages in the long run, could successfully gather sufficient 
information for implementing a VCG mechanism. We have also argued that the 
auctioneer’s discretion played a significant role in further preserving the buyers’ 
privacy. 
  We can expect the concept of representative valuations to play decisive roles, even 
in various incentive problems concerning compatibility with complexity and privacy 
preservation other than the problem of price-based VCG mechanisms. For example, the 
earlier version of this paper (Matsushima (2010)) investigated price-based 
core-selecting auction mechanisms; by using the concept of representative valuation 
functions, along with the assumption of connectedness, the paper showed how a 
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